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‘Vladimir’s choice’ refers to the tendency for people to favor the ingroup relative to the 
outgroup—even when doing so requires that people sacrifi ce ingroup profi ts in absolute 
terms. We investigated correlates of this tendency by asking a sample of White undergraduates 
to complete an allocation task using a resource allocation matrix. While there was a slight 
tendency for Vladimir’s choice to increase with increasing levels of ethnic identifi cation, this 
tendency disappeared when other factors were considered. Consistent with realistic group 
confl ict theory and social dominance theory, the tendency to make Vladimir’s choice increased 
with increasing levels of perceived intergroup competition and social dominance orientation. 
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One day God came down to Vladimir, a poor 
peasant, and said: ‘Vladimir, I will grant you one 
wish. Anything you want will be yours’. However, 
God added: ‘There is one condition. Anything I give 
to you will be granted to your neighbor, Ivan, twice 
over’. Vladimir immediately answered, saying: ‘OK, 
take out one of my eyes.’ Eastern European fable
This fable illustrates one of the most disturbing 
and fascinating human tendencies documented 
by research on social identity theory (SIT): the 
tendency for people to choose to disadvantage 
others, even when doing so comes at the cost of 
disadvantaging themselves. Early SIT research 
using the minimal groups paradigm (e.g. Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) showed that 
many people, when placed in an intergroup 
context, behave just as Vladimir does toward 
his neighbor. Specifi cally, when given allocation 
tasks, people tend to favor ingroup members over 
outgroup members—something that holds true 
even when group membership is determined on 
trivial or random bases. And such discrimination 
takes a special, ‘group-comparative’ form. In the 
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language of early social identity researchers, 
people tend to follow a strategy of maximum 
difference (MD) rather than maximum in-group 
profi t (MIP) or maximum joint profi t (MJP; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986, p. 14) in more colloquial terms, 
it appears that people are more interested in 
showing up their outgroups than in profi ting 
their ingroup per se.
Much research has sought to account for this 
pattern of fi ndings, and various hypotheses 
have been ruled out. For example, this basic 
tendency for discrimination cannot be explained 
simply in terms of participants’ self-interest or 
group-interest (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Gagnon & 
Bourhis, 1996; Perreault & Bourhis, 1998). It 
cannot be explained in terms of demand char-
acteristics (Turner, 1975). And, despite the ele-
gance of ‘rational actor’ and ‘homo economicus’ 
arguments (Becker, 1957), which suggest that 
people are motivated to achieve maximal 
ingroup gains regardless of outgroup outcomes, 
these arguments apparently do a poor job of 
explaining social identity phenomena. Indeed, 
a steady and consistent line of research shows 
that some people make ‘Vladimir’s choice’ (i.e. 
follow an MD strategy) even when doing so 
clearly minimizes absolute ingroup gains (e.g. 
Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; 
Turner, 1975; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987).
SIT offers a cogent accounting of this pat-
tern of fi ndings. According to SIT, people base 
their identities, in part, on the social groups to 
which they belong. Thus people possess, in 
addition to unique personal identities, social 
identities—identities that refl ect their group 
memberships (see Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). According 
to SIT, people also have a critical need to see 
themselves in a positive light, or to maintain (or 
achieve) a positive self-concept. It is therefore be-
lieved that people strive to maintain (or acquire) 
positive social identities, which—SIT suggests—are 
based largely on favorable ingroup–outgroup 
comparisons (i.e. assessments of ingroups relative 
to outgroups; see Turner, 1975).
SIT maintains that people show ingroup 
preferences in minimal group studies because 
the existence of minimal group categorizations 
(in the absence of ‘real’ competing group 
interests) is suffi cient to invoke people’s funda-
mental interest in laying claim to a positive 
social identity. That said, SIT also holds that 
‘real’ groups, particularly those to which people 
feel most tied, are likely to exert the greatest 
control over behavior. That is, everything else 
being equal, the more strongly people identify 
with the ingroup (i.e. the more potent that social 
identifi cation), the more likely they should be to 
make Vladimir’s choice (i.e. use an MD strategy; 
see Hogg & Abrams, 1990). 
SIT also maintains that socio-structural para-
meters such as group status, status stability, 
status legitimacy, and permeability of group 
boundaries affect people’s tendency to discrim-
inate (Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 
2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In particular, and 
also consistent with the expectations of realistic 
group confl ict theory (Bobo, 1988), because 
SIT posits that positive social identity is based 
largely on assessments of ingroups relative to 
outgroups, it follows that the more competition 
people perceive between groups (i.e. the more 
relevant outgroups are for assessing ingroup 
success), the more likely people should be to 
make Vladimir’s choice when completing an 
allocation task. In short, social identity theorists 
suggest that group-based discrimination largely 
serves to enable people to maintain (or achieve) 
positive self-regard (Tajfel & Turner, 1986); that 
it entails positive assessments of ingroups relative 
to outgroups; and that it can be enhanced by 
ingroup identifi cation. The reasoning of SIT 
further suggests that group-based discrimination 
should be enhanced by perceptions of intergroup 
competition. 
Social dominance theorists concur with the 
SIT interpretation of people’s tendency to make 
Vladimir’s choice. They agree, for example, that 
discrimination can be elicited on the basis of 
trivial ingroup/outgroup classifi cations, that 
it is often ‘group-comparative’ in nature, and 
that it is likely to be enhanced by both ingroup 
identifi cation and perceptions of group compe-
tition. But social dominance theorists also make 
an additional prediction. Namely, the tendency 
to make Vladimir’s choice should also be related 
to social dominance orientation (SDO) among 
members of relatively high-status groups (see 
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Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994). 
While this prediction has never been explicitly 
tested, it follows directly from the logic of social 
dominance theory: the greater one’s desire 
to maintain and establish group-based social 
hierarchy, the more likely one should be to 
endorse the relative advantage of dominant 
groups over subordinate groups, even if that 
advantage comes at the cost of reduced absolute 
gains for the dominant group (see Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999). 
Thus, the purpose of this research is quite 
straightforward. We are interested in determining 
the degree to which both perceived zero-sum 
intergroup competition and SDO contribute to 
Vladimir’s choice allocation decisions, over and 
above the effects of social identifi cation that have 
been so broadly demonstrated by social identity 
research. 
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 186 White under-
graduates from the University of California, 
Los Angeles (UCLA), all of whom were US citizens. 
Participants were recruited for participation by 
the offer of four (randomly distributed) US$50 
prizes. There were 89 males, 96 females, and 1 
student who did not indicate a gender.
Procedure 
Participants in this study were asked to complete 
a 13-page questionnaire, which included meas-
ures of ethnic identifi cation, perceived group 
competition, SDO, economic conservatism, and 
gender. At the end of this questionnaire, all 
participants were given an identical allocation 
task (see Appendix 1). 
In the allocation task they were told that the 
Regents of the University of California had 
decided to allocate an unspecifi ed amount of 
money to predominantly White and minority 
student organizations, and they were asked to 
select—among seven different options—the 
breakdown of funds that they felt should be 
made. The setup of these seven options was in-
spired by, but not identical to, the basic allocation 
structure used by Tajfel (1978). At one extreme, 
participants could opt to give relatively large 
amounts of money to both predominantly White 
and minority organizations, but predominantly 
White organizations would receive slightly less 
money than minority organizations (19 million 
vs. 25 million). At the other extreme, participants 
could opt to give both groups relatively small 
amounts of money, but in this case predominantly 
White organizations would receive more money 
than minority organizations (7 million vs. 
1 million). Thus, in line with the primary focus 
of this article, absolute gains (i.e. maximizing 
the amount of money given to the ingroup 
and maximum joint return) were pitted against 
relative gains (i.e. maximizing the ratio between 
ingroup gains and outgroup gains). It should be 
recognized that social identity theorists have, 
historically, made use of a variety of different 
allocation matrices and measurement tech-
niques for assessing preferences (see Bourhis 
& Gagnon, 2001; Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 
1994 for reviews). Because the tendency to 
prefer relative to absolute gains was the sole 
dependent variable of interest in this research, 
however, no other matrices were presented to 
participants.1
Variables
Ethnic group identifi cation On the fi rst page 
of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to 
classify themselves into one of several different 
ethnic groups, following the question: ‘Which 
ethnic group do you belong to?’ The choices 
included groups such as ‘African American’, 
‘White’, ‘Latino/Chicano’, ‘Asian American’, 
and ‘Other (please specify)’. Only students 
selecting ‘White’ were included in the present 
analysis.
After respondents were primed with these 
ethnic categories, they were asked four ques-
tions about identification with their ethnic 
group (1 - not at all, 7 - very): (1) ‘How strongly do 
you identify with other members of your ethnic 
group?’, (2) ‘How important is your ethnicity to 
your identity?’, (3) ‘How often do you think of 
yourself as a member of your ethnic group?’, and 
(4) ‘How close do you feel to other members 
of your ethnic group?’ These items formed a 
reliable ethnic identifi cation scale (α = .82).
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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Perceived group competition Two questions 
placed toward the middle of the questionnaire 
(on page 6) measured the degree to which stu-
dents perceived zero-sum competition between 
Whites and minorities: (1) ‘Better jobs for 
African Americans means fewer good jobs for 
Whites’, (2) ‘The economic advancement of 
certain groups threatens the advancement of 
other ethnic groups’. (1 - strongly disagree, 7 - strongly 
agree). These items formed a perceived group 
competition scale with adequate reliability 
(α = .68).
SDO SDO was also measured toward the middle 
of the questionnaire (on page 5). This construct 
was measured using the comprehensive 16-item 
SDO6 Scale. As is standard practice, the measure 
used a 1–7 scale, where high scores indicated 
high degrees of SDO (α = .91). The SDO6 Scale 
consists of items such as: ‘Superior groups 
should dominate inferior groups’; ‘Group equal-
ity should be our ideal’ (reverse coded); and ‘To 
get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to 
step on other groups’ (see Pratto et al., 1994, 
for details). 
Economic conservatism This single-item vari-
able, measured toward the beginning of the 
questionnaire (on page 2), was included here so 
that we could control for economic conservatism 
when examining the effects of the other variables 
on Vladimir’s choice. Respondents were asked: 
‘In terms of economic issues, how would you de-
scribe your political attitudes and beliefs?’ 
Answers to this question were given on a 7-point 
scale, ranging from ‘1 - very liberal’ to ‘7 - very 
conservative’. 
Gender The very fi rst item on the questionnaire 
(appearing on page 1) asked participants to 
indicate their gender. Males were coded as ‘1’ and 
females as ‘2’. Like economic conservatism, this 
variable was included as a control variable. 
Vladimir’s choice (VC) The dependent 
variable (the tendency to employ maximum 
differentiation instead of maximum ingroup 
profi t or maximum joint profi t, which we will term 
simply ‘Vladimir’s choice’, or ‘VC’) was measured 
toward the end of the questionnaire, when 
participants were asked to make the allocation 
decision concerning White and minority student 
organizations.2 This variable was measured on a 
7-point scale. A score of ‘1’ indicated a strong 
tendency to prefer absolute profi ts to relative 
profi ts (the decision to give $19 million to White 
groups and $25 million to minority groups). 
A score of ‘1’ would thus be consistent with a MIP 
or MJP allocation rule. A (midpoint) score of ‘4’, 
on the other hand, refl ected a simple ‘parity 
allocation’ (the decision to give $13 million to 
each group). And a score of ‘7’ indicated a strong 
tendency to prefer relative profi ts to absolute 
profi ts (the decision to give $7 million to White 
groups and $1 million to minority groups). 
A score of ‘7’ would therefore represent an MD, 
or extreme VC allocation rule. 
Results
Distribution of allocation decisions 
As can be seen in Table 1, only 11.4% of the 
students chose to allocate funds so as to max-
imize absolute profi ts (i.e. allocated $19 million 
to Whites and $25 million to minorities). Most 
of the students (55.7%) instead chose to allo-
cate smaller but equal amounts of money to 
both groups (i.e. $13 million to each group). 
However, a minority of students (4.5%) made 
the most extreme VC (i.e. extreme MD choice) 
Table 1. Distribution of allocation decisions
Allocations to White versus minority student organizations (in millions of dollars)
19 to Whites 17 to Whites 15 to Whites 13 to Whites 11 to Whites 9 to Whites 7 to Whites
vs. 25 to vs. 21 to vs. 17 to vs. 13 to vs. 9 to vs. 5 to vs. 1 to Total
minorities  minorities minorities minorities minorities minorities minorities allocation
11.4% 6.8% 10.2% 55.7% 6.8 % 4.5% 4.5% 100.0%
n =20 n =12 n =18 n = 98 n =12 n = 8 n = 8 N =176
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by allocating $7 million to Whites and only 
$1 million to minorities. It is notable that both 
of these latter allocation strategies clearly de-
viate from the ‘rational actor’ paradigm, which 
presumes that people will opt to maximize 
ingroup profi t, regardless of profi ts enjoyed 
by outgroups.
Correlates of allocation decision 
The major focus of this inquiry is to explore 
whether or not ethnic identifi cation, perceived 
group competition, and SDO, net of economic 
conservatism and gender, are related to these dif-
ferent social allocations. The product-moment 
correlation coeffi cients in Table 2 show that 
VC was related to four of the fi ve independent 
variables. Specifi cally, VC was positively related 
to (a) increasing levels of economic conserva-
tism (r = .16, p < .05), (b) being male rather than 
female (r = –.17, p < .01), (c) increasing levels of 
perceived group competition (r = .23, p < .01), and 
(d) increasing levels of SDO (r = .31, p < .001). 
The only variable that VC was not related to was 
ethnic identifi cation (r = .11, ns).
Net covariates of VC
We employed a multiple regression analysis to 
examine the net and total relationships of all 
fi ve independent variables with VC. We also ex-
plored whether or not there were any two-way 
or three-way interactions between ethnic group 
identifi cation, perceived group competition, 
and SDO. Specifi cally, we performed a four-
step hierarchical regression analysis with VC 
as the criterion variable, and the fi ve variables 
discussed above as predictors. Employing 
Aiken & West’s (1991) multiple regression ap-
proach, mean-centered gender and economic 
conservatism were entered at Step 1; mean-
centered ethnic identifi cation, perceived group 
competition, and SDO at Step 2; all two-way 
interactions among ethnic identifi cation, per-
ceived group competition, and SDO at Step 3; 
and the three-way interaction among these same 
variables at Step 4.
Table 3 reveals that at Step 1, gender and 
economic conservatism each made marginally 
signifi cant and unique contributions to the Ta
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prediction of VC. However, the greatest con-
tribution to the prediction of VC occurred at 
Step 2, when the effects of perceived group 
competition, SDO, and ethnic identifi cation 
were added. Of these three variables, only SDO 
and perceived group competition made statis-
tically signifi cant and unique contributions: the 
higher one’s level of SDO and the more one 
perceived intergroup competition, the greater 
one’s likelihood of making VC (β = .27, p < .01; 
and β = .18, p < .05, respectively). The two- and 
three-way interaction (Steps 3 and 4) did not 
signifi cantly predict VC.
Summary and discussion 
Consistent with SIT, and at odds with the ‘rational 
actor’ perspective, our data suggest that people 
do not always seek to maximize absolute ingroup 
profi t. In our simple allocation situation, this 
was illustrated by the fact that less than 12% 
of respondents maximized absolute returns to 
the ingroup. Rather, most respondents chose 
to allocate smaller, yet exactly equal, amounts of 
money to both the ingroup and outgroup. Thus 
it appears that for most participants, ‘fairness’, 
‘equity’, or ‘equality’ motives trumped motives 
for absolute profi t or relative advantage. At the 
same time, and as anticipated, a substantial per-
centage of participants (15.8%) were appar-
ently willing to sacrifi ce millions of dollars to 
ingroup organizations so long as these organ-
izations received more money than outgroup 
organizations. 
The major purpose of this article has been 
to determine if, net of social identifi cation, the 
degree to which people are willing to sacrifi ce 
absolute gains for relative gains (i.e. make 
VC) is related to perceived zero-sum competi-
tion between groups and to the desire for 
hierarchical relationships among groups (i.e. 
SDO). The data appear to be affi rmative in 
both cases. Thus, these fi ndings are consistent 
with the expectations of both realistic group 
confl ict theory (see Bobo, 1988) and social 
dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). It 
should be observed that, because our analysis 
controlled for economic conservatism, these 
effects cannot be attributed to purely ideological 
values regarding the economic distribution of 
resources in general.
Surprisingly, however, these results are also 
noteworthy in terms of what was not found. Most 
importantly, while there was a slight positive 
correlation between ingroup identification 
and VC, this correlation was not signifi cant, 
especially when considered alongside the cor-
relations for perceived group competition and 
SDO. The question naturally arises as to why 
ingroup identifi cation did not play a larger 
role. In thinking about this problem, it is worth 
bearing in mind that the relationship between 
Table 3. Tendency to make Vladimir’s choice as a function of ethnic identity, perceived group competition and 
SDO. (Entries are standardized multiple regressions coeffi cients)
Independent variables Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Female –.15+ –.12 –.12+ –.12+
Economic conservatism .13+ .03 .02 .02 
Perceived group competition  .18* .17* .17*
SDO   .27** .27** .27**
Ethnic identifi cation  –.01 –.01 –.01
Ethnic identifi cation × perceived group competition   .01 .01
SDO × ethnic identifi cation   –.05 –.05
SDO × perceived group competition   .04 .04
SDO × perceived group competition × ethnic identifi cation    .00
Signifi cant increase in R2  .05* .12*** .00 .00
Adj. R2 .04* .14*** .13*** .13***
+p < .10; * p < .05 (one-tailed test); ** p < .01 (one-tailed test); *** p < .001 (one-tailed test).
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ingroup identifi cation and ingroup bias has been 
found  to be somewhat labile across studies (e.g. 
Hinkle & Brown, 1990). In addressing this lability, 
Turner (1999) has argued that a substantial 
relationship between ingroup identifi cation and 
ingroup bias is likely to emerge only under fi ve 
conditions: (1) the individual categorizes herself 
in terms of membership in the relevant group; 
(2) the relevant social identity is salient with 
respect to the comparative judgment at hand; 
(3) the ingroup and outgroup are perceived to 
be interrelated within an overall social structure; 
(4) the dimension of intergroup comparison is 
relevant to intergroup status relationships; and 
(5) the outgroup is relevant to the particular 
comparative judgment being made. 
Given Turner’s conditions, should we have 
expected ingroup identifi cation to be a strong 
predictor of VC in this study? Considering the 
long, infected history of race relations in the 
United States, and the highly charged and com-
petitive relationships among ethnic groups on 
modern American campuses (e.g. see Crisostomo, 
2001), we have strong reason to believe that all of 
Turner’s conditions were satisfi ed. Furthermore, 
while it is generally recognized that ethnic group 
identifi cation is not as salient or powerful for 
Whites as it is for ethnic minorities (e.g. Jaret & 
Reitzes, 1999; Larkey & Hecht, 1995), it should 
be borne in mind that SIT was initially developed 
to address racial discrimination (among Whites), 
and that in this study Whites’ mean ethnic iden-
tifi cation was moderately strong (i.e. 4.01 on a 
1–7 scale) and clearly salient enough to covary 
with other relevant variables (e.g. SDO and 
economic conservatism). 
That being said, it is also worth observing that 
the dependent variable used in this research is 
not a traditional SIT variable. Furthermore, it is 
worth considering here the distinction between 
ingroup favoritism versus outgroup derogation 
and aggression (see Brewer, 1999 for a review). 
Some SIT theorists have argued that ingroup 
identifi cation should primarily be associated 
with the former rather than the latter (Amiot 
& Bourhis, 2005; Brewer, 1979, 2001). Research 
by Mummendey and colleagues on the positive–
negative asymmetry in social discrimination 
(see Mummendey & Otten, 1998 and Otten & 
Mummendey, 2000 for reviews) suggests that 
‘positive discrimination’ (biased rewarding be-
havior) is more readily enacted than ‘negative 
discrimination’ (biased punishing behavior) 
and that these two types of discrimination may 
be fundamentally different in terms of the 
contexts in which they occur. Indeed, in a recent 
meta-analysis performed by Buhl (1999), it was 
concluded that ‘discrimination in the negative 
domain is not just discrimination in the positive 
domain on a lower level’ (p. 57). Thus, to the 
extent that our VC measure taps into outgroup 
aggression rather than ingroup favoritism, the 
relatively weak relationship between ingroup 
identifi cation and VC is not so surprising. Given 
the totality of these various considerations 
regarding ingroup identifi cation, along with 
existing research on socio-structural parameters 
(e.g. group status, group permeability), we feel 
the relationship between identifi cation and 
discrimination is likely to be far more subtle and 
complex than previously imagined (see Aberson 
& Howanski, 2002; Bettencourt et al., 2001).
In conclusion, the principal aim of this research 
was to better understand why people would 
choose to engage in a VC allocation strategy—
willingly sacrifi cing absolute ingroup profi ts 
in favor of relative, ingroup-over-outgroup, 
profi ts. While the expected effects for ethnic 
identifi cation did not obtain here, as described 
above, there was nonetheless good evidence 
that both perceived group competition and 
SDO are implicated in VC decisions. Future 
research on VC should seek not only to uncover 
when and why social identification will be 
most relevant, but also to address questions 
about the contextual generalizability of the 
present fi ndings. Namely, will the tendency to 
make Vladimir’s choice always be related to 
perceived group competition and SDO—when 
using different types of dependent measures; 
across different decision-making contexts; 
with different types of groups; and in different 
cultures? Isn’t it possible, for example, that 
the tendency for people to see social groups as 
locked into zero-sum relationships is present 
only in some (highly competitive) cultures, and 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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that perceived competition is thus not relevant 
in other (more collaborative and communal) 
cultures? Even within a given culture, it is not 
clear that perceived competition and SDO 
will relate to VC equally strongly for members 
of both dominant and subordinate groups. 
Indeed, what is known as the ‘ideological asym-
metry hypothesis’ within social dominance 
theory would suggest that VC would be more 
positively associated with SDO among members 
of dominant rather than subordinate groups 
(see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Examining these 
types of questions will be important in helping 
us to develop a more complete understanding 
of when and why VC, as opposed to other forms 
of ingroup bias, is most likely to occur.
Note
1. No pull scores were calculated because only one 
specifi c type of matrix was employed in the 
present study (i.e. maximum differentiation 
pitted against a combination of maximum 
ingroup profi t and maximum joint profi t) and a 
minimum of two different matrices are required 
to calculate a pull (or difference) score (see 
Bourhis et al., 1994 for further details).
2. The task asked participants to ‘Assume that 
the Regents of the University of California 
have decided to allocate an unspecifi ed 
amount of money to the support of various 
ethnic student organizations. Some of these 
consist of predominantly White students while 
others consist of primarily minority students’. 
Participants were asked to check one of seven 
alternatives to ‘indicate which combination 
you feel should be allocated to the student 
organizations’. The steps in the scale (in 
$million for White:Minority) were 7:1, 9:5, 11:9, 
13:13, 15:17, 17:21, and 19:25. 
Acknowledgment
This research was conducted with support from the 
Russell Sage Foundation.
References
Aberson, C. L., & Howanski, L. M. (2002). Effects 
of self-esteem, status, and identifi cation on two 
forms of ingroup bias. Current Research in Social 
Psychology, 7, 225–243.
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: 
Testing and interpreting interactions. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Amiot, C. E., & Bourhis, R. Y. (2005). Ideological 
beliefs as determinants of discrimination in 
positive and negative outcome distributions. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 581–598.
Becker, G. S. (1957). The economics of discrimination. 
London: University of Chicago Press.
Bettencourt, B. A., Charlton, K., Dorr, N., & Hume, 
D. L. (2001). Status differences and in-group 
bias: A meta-analytic examination of the effects 
of status stability, status legitimacy, and group 
permeability. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 
520–542.
Billig, M., & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization 
and similarity in intergroup behaviour. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 27–52.
Bobo, L. (1988). Group confl ict, prejudice, and the 
paradox of contemporary racial attitudes. In 
P. A. Katz & D. A. Taylor (Eds.), Eliminating 
racism: Profi les in controversy (pp. 85–116). 
New York: Plenum.
Bourhis, R. Y., & Gagnon, A. (2001). Social 
orientations in the minimal group paradigm.
In R. Brown & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Blackwell 
handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes 
(pp. 89–111). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Bourhis, R. Y., Sachdev, I., & Gagnon, A. (1994). 
Intergroup research with the Tajfel matrices: 
Methodological notes. In M. P. Zanna & 
J. M. Olson (Eds.), The psychology of prejudice: 
The Ontario Symposium (Vol. 7, pp. 209–232). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal 
intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational 
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307–324.
Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: 
Ingroup love or outgroup hate? Journal of Social 
Issues, 55, 429–444.
Brewer, M. B. (2001). Ingroup identifi cation and 
intergroup confl ict: When does ingroup love 
become outgroup hate? In R. D. Ashmore, 
L. Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), Social identity, 
intergroup confl ict, and confl ict reduction (pp. 
17–41). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Buhl, T. (1999). Positive–negative asymmetry in 
social discrimination: Meta-analytical evidence. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2 (1), 51–58.
Crisostomo, L. A. (2001, November). Neo-segregation 
occurring on campus. The Badger Herald Online. 
http://www.badgerherald.com/vnews/display.
v/ART/2001/11/19/3bf9cfbb438e2.
Gagnon, A., & Bourhis, R. Y. (1996). Discrimination 
in the minimal group paradigm: Social identity 
265
Sidanuis et al. vladimir’s choice
or self-interest? Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 22, 1289–1301.
Hinkle, S., & Brown, R. (1990). Intergroup 
comparisons and social identity: Some links and 
lacunae. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), Social 
identity theory: Constructive and critical advances (pp. 
48–70). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1990). Social 
identifi cations: A social psychology of intergroup 
relations and group processes. London: Routledge.
Jaret, C., & Reitzes, D. C. (1999). The importance 
of racial-ethnic identity and social setting for 
Blacks, Whites, and multiracials. Sociological 
Perspectives, 42, 711–737. 
Larkey, L. K., & Hecht, M. L. (1995). A comparative 
study of African American and European 
American ethnic identity. International Journal 
of Intercultural Relations, 19, 483–504. 
Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (1998). Positive–
negative asymmetry in social discrimination. 
In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European 
review of social psychology (Vol. 9, pp. 107–143). 
New York: Wiley.
Otten, S., & Mummendey, A. (2000). Valence-
dependent probability of ingroup favoritism 
between minimal groups: An integrative view 
on the positive–negative asymmetry in social 
discrimination. In D. Capozza & R. Brown 
(Eds.), Social identity processes (pp. 33–48). 
London: Sage.
Perreault, S., & Bourhis, R. Y. (1998). Social 
identifi cation, interdependence and 
discrimination. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 1, 49–66.
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, 
B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: 
A personality variable predicting social and 
political attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 67, 741–763.
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: 
An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and 
oppression. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tajfel, H. (1978). Differentiation between social groups. 
London. Academic Press.
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, 
C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup 
behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
1, 149–178.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social 
identity theory of intergroup behavior. In 
S. Worchel & W.A. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of 
intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago: 
Nelson Hall. 
Turner, J.C. (1975). Social comparison and social 
identity: Some prospects for intergroup behavior. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 
54, 101–114.
Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current issues in research 
on social identity and self-categorization theories. 
In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.), 
Social identity: Context, commitment, content (pp. 
6–34). Oxford: 
Blackwell Science.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. 
D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the 
social group: A self categorization theory. 
Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
Paper received 3 November 2004; revised version accepted 
10 February 2006. 
Biographical notes
jim sidanius is a full professor in the departments 
of psychology and African and African American 
studies at Harvard University.
hillary haley is a lecturer in the department of 
psychology at the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA).
ludwin molina is a PhD candidate in the 
department of psychology at the University 
of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).
 
felicia pratto is a full professor of psychology in 
the department of psychology at the University of 
Connecticut.
